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1. Introduction  
 
Kloster and Anderson have written an inspiring paper, encouraging us to expand our thinking 
about argument cultures, their members, and standards. They are working toward understanding 
how “groups can welcome and benefit from the individual diversity which is already present in 
our communities” (Kloster & Anderson 2020, p. 2). To do so, they focus on “groups whose 
members may have divergent or incompatible beliefs about evidence or rational persuasion” 
(ibid) and highlight children arguers as a paradigm group with the opportunity to create their 
own diverse argument culture. The example of children is contrasted against other established 
argument cultures, especially the law, to support the claim that although following best practice 
is good in some situations, there are plenty of situations where we should be open to 
acknowledge the value of new standards we may never have come to in a less inclusive argument 
culture. I am largely sympathetic with aim of the project – to expand the way we think about 
standards of reasoning and argumentation, and who to include when identifying members of 
argument(ation) communities. In that light, the following commentary is aimed at highlighting 
areas for expansion and clarification that, I think, would help strengthen the foundation being 
laid for a project with many highly worthwhile branches for continued research.  
 
2.  Diversity, Autonomy, and Truth 
 
The first place it may be valuable to clarify and expand regards how the relationship between 
arguer diversity and argumentative standard setting, and the relationship between the emergent 
standards and epistemic quality of the results, interact. The authors argue that in diverse groups 
the “[c]o-creation of reasoning permits not just the reasons but the practices of argument to vary 
from previous or external standards, in accordance with what the group members collectively are 
comfortable with as evidence and as techniques of persuasion” (p. 8). This is valuable in part 
because, if a “group does not conform to existing reasoning practices as measured by recognized 
tests, the group can take responsibility for creating, testing, and implementing its own standards 
of acceptable reasoning” (p. 14). To make their case for more flexibility on these standards they 
provide an example of kindergarten children discussing what counts as ownership, and an Asian 
undergraduate contrasting his understanding on the same topic against his peer’s. They also 
provide examples of the separation between indigenous and colonial views regarding why and how 
legal reasoning should take place. These examples explore how diverse groups can have diverse 
argument cultures, which can lead to new understandings and better reasoning among group 
participants.  
In light of their examples of the difference between colonial and indigenous perspectives 
on law, and differing views of ownership, expanding the limits of what counts as an acceptable 
contribution to the resolution of a difference of opinion on these matters may indeed help the 
participants come to a resolution, or if resolution is not the goal, at least the ability to discuss these 
topics amicably. But as the authors also note, we are lucky to live in a Canadian context where 
group diversity is encouraged and normalized to greater degrees (even if still far from ideal!) than 
in other parts of the world (p. 6). One worry I have, however, is that relativizing what counts as an 
acceptable argumentative standard to a group who may have a false or exaggerated confidence in 
their diversity could lead to the amplification of accepting false beliefs. For example, I can imagine 
a seemingly diverse group of flat earthers getting together and determining their own standards for 
what counts as evidence. If as Kloster and Anderson argue, “the evidence a group uses, the 
standards by which it is assessed, the forms of persuasion they use and the effectiveness with which 
they persuade others are all open to evolution as the discussion continues... It need not reflect any 
particular choices of roles or types of facilitation in order to produce ‘the best’ reasoning” (p. 9), 
then I think it is important to highlight the conditionality of their central claim on the potential to 
improve epistemic outcomes. In other words, it may be only IF diversity and IF common norms 
of open mindedness and respect are followed that free and diverse discussion MAY lead to a 
positive outcome. If any of these conditions are not met, I worry that the risk to truth of relativizing 
standards of argumentation to any particular group may loom and perhaps even amplify (Sunstein 
and Hastie 2015).  
Finally, giving autonomy to individual groups to determine their own standards of 
reasoning and argumentation may also increase the chances of encountering deep disagreements. 
If two argument cultures have markedly different standards of evidence and inference, and there 
is no abstract or authoritative view of reason, appeal to which could help settle a matter, it is unclear 
how rational disagreement resolution between these two groups could meaningfully get underway. 
This problem may be seen in their example of the difference in view between colonial and 
indigenous perspectives on law. I would like to hear more about the potential for their overall 
suggestion in the paper to contribute to improving a gap of this proportion. 
 
3. Children Arguers 
 
Given my interest in youth and argumentation, I was also especially drawn to the discussion of 
children as arguers. One aspect of the discussion that may benefit from clarification regards the 
competency of children arguers and their acceptability as members of any given argument culture. 
Throughout the paper, Kloster and Anderson reference children’s ability to participate in reasoning 
and argumentation. But at the same time, they are the central contrast, identified as a paradigm 
example of arguers (mostly) free from argument culture, able to create their own culture outside 
traditional restraints. For example, they say “Children are presumed not to bring any extensive 
experience to reasoning” (p. 1), which is partly why they are used as the contrasting class against 
established argument cultures. Yet, the Philosophy for Children program recognizes that “At the 
heart of all practices of Philosophy for Children is the recognition that children are capable of 
reasoning together and reasoning well about both abstract and applied philosophical issues” (p. 
10).  
This tension raises two areas that might benefit from clarification. The first regards the 
extent to which recognizing children as people who can reason well begs the question of what 
constitutes reasoning standards. In other words, to what extent would we be able to say children 
are capable of “reasoning together and reasoning well” if we have not already determined a 
framework to identify and evaluate reasoning? How could such an evaluation of children’s abilities 
occur if we did not already have the standards we are waiting to see emerge from them? 
One response could be to argue, in line with the evolutionary theory of argument, that 
reasoning is not a purely learned ability, but is at least in part innate (Mercier 2011). Taking this 
approach, however, it would still help to identify to what extent the new standards emerging from 
diverse groups are unique and to what extent they conform with such an evolutionary view. 
The second area that could be clarified regards the justification for why children are or are 
not rightful participants in any given argument culture. The authors seem have some conflicting 
sentiments in this regard. Toward the end of the paper, Kloster and Anderson write, “Where adults 
differ from children is in having a much clearer entitlement to participate in reasoning. If we 
accept that children have the ability to engage in rational thought and rational argument, that they 
have perspectives and criticisms, and experiences to draw on that adults may not, it follows that it 
is also worthwhile searching for ways to hear what they have to say for the sake of inclusion” (p. 
13, emphasis added). Especially in light of much of the rest of the paper, I am not sure why adults 
should be thought to have much clearer entitlement to participate in reasoning, or why if children 
are permitted into these practices it only be for the sake of inclusion.  
It seems more consistent with much of their paper to argue, as I believe, that children have 
exactly as much entitlement to participate in reasoning as adults do. This is not just because of 
their abilities, but because they are humans deserving of recognition as knowers and transmitters 
of knowledge. Even if they may be wrong more often than adults, the grounding justification for 
their entitlement to participate in argumentative practices should not change. And, as Kloster and 
Anderson emphasise, we can learn from them much more often than we may think. This sentiment 
seems much more consistent with their ideal of “using principles of accommodating diversity, [so 
that] a group can co-create the standards of evidence and methods of persuasion that would permit 
children and adults to participate as equals in reasoned discussions beyond the classroom” (p. 14). 
So, a further clarification of the level of entitlement children should have to participate in 
argumentative practices, along with an explanation of the grounding for that view, would help 
reconcile this tension. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Kloster and Anderson have presented a strong argument for expanding our thinking about 
argumentation standards and how they relate to differing argument cultures. I find the paper not 
only persuasive, but noble. At heart it tells us to be humble, and for good reason – there is much 
we don’t know, and the consequences of that ignorance may cause unnecessary harm via 
community exclusion. Opening ourselves to new possibilities and understandings of what 
argument can be by encouraging diversity in our argument cultures may not only benefit our 
argumentative practice, but also welcome a number of people into a culture from which they have 
been excluded for too long. 
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